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About thirty years ago, Miss Maria Ward of 
Huntingdon, with only seven thousand 
pounds, had the good luck to captivate Sir 
Thomas Bertram, of Mansfield Park, in the 
county of Northhampton, and to be thereby 
raised to the rank of a baronet's lady, with all 
the comforts and consequences of an 
handsome house and large income. All 
Huntingdon exclaimed on the greatness of 
the match, and her uncle, the lawyer, himself, 
allowed her to be at least three thousand 
pounds short of any equitable claim to it. She 
had two sisters to be benefited by her 
elevation … - Mansfield Park, Jane Austen. 
Pierre Bourdieu argues in Language and Symbolic Power, that there are 
certain forms of capital which determine one's position in the social world: 
“Capital, which can exist in objectified form – in the form of material properties – 
or, in the case of cultural capital, in an incorporated form, one which can be 
guaranteed, represents power over a field” (Bourdieu 231). The forms of 
economic, social, and cultural capital are all in relation to each other in the 
social field and “[people] are thus defined by their relative positions in this 
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space” (Bourdieu 231). In this manner, every person belongs to a hierarchy 
based on the type and amount of capital one possesses. 
In Changing Families: Relationships in Context, Anne-Marie Ambert 
explains that, “[t]he basic assumption behind social exchange theory is that 
people interact and make choices so as to maximize their own benefits or 
rewards and to minimize their costs” (Ambert 13). Using Bourdieu's model then, 
the act of marriage can be understood as a rational exchange to maximize 
benefits such as economic, cultural, or social capital, while minimizing costs for 
participants. Historically, marriage was often exclusively used as a means of 
distributing wealth and inheritance making marriage choice more about the 
exchange of economic capital, and less about romantic love: “A family already 
high in the social pyramid could catapult itself from a hilly little dukedom to the 
rule of more than half the world through a clever and lucky marriage 
strategy” (Gottleib 52). It was not until much later during the mid 19th century 
that “[a]t last, very gradually, the phenomenon of romantic love began to spread 
in life, as it had long done in literature” (Hardy 129), culminating with our own 
century, “and in particular the last forty years or so which have seen [… ] the 
final degradation and therefore popularisation of romantic love” (Hardy 131). It 
appears that now, more than ever, marriage is a result of romantic love, 
available to all classes, instead of a rational exchange of capital (Gottleib 272). 
Yet, is this truly the case? Is the choice to marry today less about economic 
capital and more about romantic love than it was before the industrial 
revolution? With the creation of the 1968 Divorce act in Canada entitling 
couples to ‘no-fault' divorces, divorce rates soared and “[c]urrent estimates 
indicate that about 37 percent of Canadian marriages end in divorce, ranging 
from 48 percent in Quebec to a low 22 percent in Prince Edward 
Island” (Ambert 390). Increases in divorce are also coupled with an extremely 
large increase in prenuptial agreements as individuals seek to protect their 
economic assets (Flora 54). 
Similarly interesting is the growing number of couples who are choosing to 
cohabit, rather than marry. Ambert writes that “a substantial proportion of 
Canadians now choose common-law rather than marriage as a first 
union” (Ambert 211) and “[c]ohabitations are more likely to result in marriage 
when the male partner has economic resources” (Ambert 211). Since 
cohabitation has a higher chance of ending in marriage if the male partner has 
economic resources, it seems marriage is once again being based on the 
exchange of capital similar to that of pre-industrial years.  
The comparable increases in divorces, and prenuptial agreements – all 
grounded heavily in the economic sphere of marriage – demonstrate a renewed 
trend of basing marriages on economic exchange and contractual negotiations 
rather than solely ‘romantic love' (Hardy 131). As Arlene Dublin, a family law 
attorney from New York, states: “Romantic love is one thing; marriage is 
another. It is a spiritual and emotional bond, for sure. But it is also an economic 
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partnership” (Flora 54). Today, the importance of this economic bond is 
becoming larger, demonstrating a renewal of historical forms of marriage 
arrangement and exchange. 
To understand this trend, however, it is important to first have a more 
comprehensive look at the formation of pre-industrial marriage arrangements. 
Beatrice Gottleib explains: “For the small farmer or peasant it was well-nigh 
impossible to get along without being married. Marriage made it possible to do 
the work that had to be done every day, and it was also needed to provide for 
the orderly transfer of property” (Gottleib 51). While Gottleib's analysis 
demonstrates the importance of marriage to the ‘day-to-day' economic 
sustenance of the peasant class, it more importantly states the significance of 
wealth transfers in pre-industrial Western Europe. Having economic 
independence was a necessary factor towards getting married, and the 
inheritance of wealth allowed young men the economic independence needed 
to marry in a peasant economy:  
The Western European Marriage Pattern was 
associated with a peasant economy and an 
inheritance system which demanded a 
certain amount of property as a prerequisite 
to marriage. More simply, in order to get 
married, men had to save or, in most cases, 
wait until their father died and a piece of land, 
a workshop or a cottage became available 
(Devos 101). 
Gottleib even goes so far as to say that “there can be no doubt that 
marriage was closely associated in people's minds with economic 
independence” (Gottleib 60). This sentiment is echoed by the fact that “full adult 
status was achieved only through marriage” (Gottleib 51) and that those who 
“did not inherit or could not find another source of income would defer 
marriage” (Devos 101). 
Although economic independence was the main prerequisite for marriage to 
occur, the reasons as to why people married were heavily entrenched in the 
exchange of economic capital between families: “The heart of the matter was 
almost always the dowry, the money or property the woman brought to the 
marriage” (Gottleib 53-54). While men profited heavily from their inheritance, 
the economic capital exchanged in marriage would also greatly benefit not only 
immediate and extended family, but also future generations: “The enhanced 
family property would descend to an heir who in turn was expected to enlarge 
it, if possible, through subsequent marriage arrangements” (Gottleib 53). This in 
turn would create a large importance around the creation of an heir, an 
extremely different phenomenon than “the modern wish to experience 
parenthood” (Gottleib 52). 
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The potential increases to a family's economic, social or cultural capital 
often made parents and other relatives directly related to the marriage process 
in terms of arrangements and contract negotiations. While the initial choice of a 
mate was commonly up to the couple themselves, arranged marriages or the 
details of contract arrangements were almost always up to the two ‘joining' 
families:  
Arranging marriages was an important and 
time-consuming activity – ‘the weightiest 
business,’ someone said. The material 
benefits to a family could be considerable, 
since marriage was one of the occasions 
when property was distributed. If the 
Hapsburgs could acquire an empire, a 
peasant family might acquire acreage and a 
merchant family might acquire capital 
(Gottleib 53). 
Due to the nature of pre-industrial marital economic exchange, there were 
incredible familial pressures to marry an appropriate mate that would greatly 
increase the economic status of the family. As well, it seems that “[t]he final 
choice of a mate was bound up with the process of working out details, which 
could be complicated. A marriage contract set up the conditions that made it 
possible for the couple to live on their own” (Gottleib 53). The marriage contract 
was an extremely important step because it ensured the exchange of economic 
capital between families and consequently “[b]argaining resembled international 
treaty negotiations” (Gottleib 53). These contracts were dealt with in a very 
serious matter due to the immense economic consequences that could result 
from their abrupt collapse. Even poor families would commonly pursue formal 
marriage contracts because of the material wealth invested in pre-industrial 
marriage (Gottleib 54). That is not to say, however, that there was no element 
of romantic love involved in such marriages, but rather that such contracts 
helped formalize the economic exchange and well being of both families 
involved. While the children may have been thinking solely of romantic love, 
their parents and extended family were also reflecting heavily on the marriage's 
economic consequences, as “[s]ometimes months of bargaining came to 
nought, and the parents had to search for other prospects” (Gottleib 54). 
Therefore the contract became a formal economic compromise between two 
families in their search for greater capital, regardless of the existence of 
romantic love between their children. 
While there is no particular date in which romantic love began to take hold 
on the foundation of marriage, it is generally agreed that the industrial 
revolution was an extremely important turning point in the evolution of romantic 
love marriages (Gottleib 269). This can be due to a variety of factors, two of 
which are the increase in romantic literature, and also the structural changes to 
the economy that the industrial revolution brought about. Jonathon Gathorne- 
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Hardy states that “[t]he sales of romantic fiction, read chiefly by married 
women of twenty-five or over, are by far the largest of any single category of 
book. These sales indicate an intense desire for romantic love” (Hardy 32). 
While his argument seems far-fetched at first glance, Hardy makes an 
interesting point about Romanticism's effects on society. In his analysis of the 
period, Hardy found that “[f]rom 1740 on a flood of novels poured on to the 
market with romantic love as their theme” (Hardy 129). If literary themes are 
any indication of changing social trends then it certainly appeared that the high 
production and high sales of romantic literature was creating a change in how 
individuals viewed the marriage relationship. Beginning with the more literate, 
wealthier classes, “it began to spread down; among some of the wealthier 
classes it became a more or less acceptable reason for marrying. Or people did 
marry for that reason accepted or not” (Hardy 129). This ‘trickle-down' effect of 
social attitudes began to slowly change the ‘economic exchange' model of 
marriage. While a direct change did not happen right away, it is noted that,  
[b]y the end of the nineteenth century, love 
among the middle classes was a mixture of 
nervous sentimentality strongly mixed with a 
regard for dividends, dowries and property. It 
is our century, and in particular the last forty 
years or so which have seen [… ] the final 
degradation and therefore popularisation of 
romantic love (Hardy 131). 
While slow, the shift to romantic love marriages “so saturates our culture, 
pervades it so completely that, like air, it passes unnoticed” (Hardy 146). What 
was once an intense struggle for economic capital has become a simple 
expression of two individuals in love. 
This transformation of the marital relationship, however, could not come 
from literature alone. The economic changes that resulted from the industrial 
revolution had a large part in disrupting the structures of marriage that created 
a dependency on the exchange of economic capital. The creation of factories 
“all but eliminated the household production of manufactured goods. The office 
building joined the factory as a place where individuals spent large portions of 
the day” (Gottleib 270). With families clustering in cities to work in factories, 
economic exchange became less important as there was less land or 
inheritance to bequeath to future generations. Removing people from a peasant 
economy, and therefore the land, familial exchange of economic capital 
became irrelevant as the land itself became less important. These changes are 
also reflected in the structure of the family in terms of creating families that are 
made up of nuclear relations, rather than extended family. This change in 
structure made marital decisions about economic exchange less important as 
the resulting capital would not be affecting as many individuals:  
Families that fit this 1800 model are next to 
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impossible to find in the Western world today 
[… ] Most people live in cities, household 
activity has little to do with economic 
production, fathers are no longer the 
absolute rulers they once were, and 
inheritance is far less important as a method 
of conveying wealth and power (Gottleib 269) 
The combination of these economic and social factors had a large effect in 
disabling marital relationships from being based solely in terms of the exchange 
of economic capital. Social changes such as the “gradual relinquishing of 
parental control over the choice of partner [and] the dying away of economic 
considerations in marriage” (Hardy 131) helped create a modern world where 
love did not have to compete with the exchange of economic capital. 
While changing attitudes towards romantic love and marriage create a fairly 
positive image of modern marriage relationships, the reality is eerily similar to 
it's pre-industrial past. Cohabitation has greatly increased in recent years and is 
seen as a fairly new form of relationship structure (Ambert 211). Yet, the 
premise behind most cohabitation reflects the situation of impoverished pre-
industrial couples: “People who did not inherit or could not find another source 
of income would defer marriage” (Devos 101). While pre-industrial social 
attitudes would not allow unmarried couples to live together, cohabitation 
serves the similar purpose of deferring marriage until economic factors are met. 
A study by Pamela J. Smock, Wendy D. Manning, and Meredith Porter found 
that among cohabitors decision to marry, “[a]pproximately 23% named only 
economic criteria or only relationships criteria; nearly 50% named both. Thus, 
overall, 72% of the sample identified at least one economic factor as a 
prerequisite for the relationship to result in marriage” (Smock, et al 687). While 
the “[e]conomic ties between parents and children [… ] [have] become unglued 
in modern society” (Burggraf 105), the overall ties to economic capital certainly 
have not. As well, Smock, Manning, and Porter's study found five themes all 
related to issues of economic capital:  
(a) having enough money, (b) the ability to 
pay for a ‘real' wedding, (c) achieving a set of 
financial goals before marriage, (d) the male 
partner's capacity to be an economic 
provider, and (e) lack of money as a source 
of stress and relationship conflict (Smock, et 
al 687). 
While particular issues such as inheritance and familial benefit do not play 
as large – if any – role in modern relationships, economic capital continues to 
play an important part, forcing couples to do a cost/benefit analysis of marriage: 
“I don't really know ‘cause the love is there uh… trust is there. Everything's 
there except money” (Smock, et al 687). Similar to pre-industrial relationships 
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which equated economic independence with marriage (Gottleib 60), 
cohabitors are found to express the exact same sentiments: “The implication is 
that one does not marry if one is struggling financially; marriage both connotes 
and requires a certain level of economic stability” (Smock, et al 687). 
Comparing these findings with the evidence that “one of the significant 
stressors in married life involves the inability to meet basic economic 
needs” (Kinnunen & Feldt 519), it seems that modern cohabitation and married 
life are still ruled by economic capital; perhaps not in the same way, but the 
relation to economic capital as a means towards marriage remains quite 
similar. 
In comparable form, prenuptial agreements serve a similar purpose as their 
pre-industrial counterparts. While historical marriage contracts were negotiated 
by parents, the modern prenuptial allows couples to assure the safety of their 
economic assets (Flora 54). Although previous forms of marital contracts were 
to formalize economic exchange between families – the exact opposite 
arrangement of the modern version of saving one's assets – their opposition 
does not connote a difference in their relation to the transfer of economic 
capital. In the article “Let'$ Make a Deal”, Carlin Flora describes one woman's 
experiences with prenuptial agreements: “When Veronica, now 52, was at her 
father's deathbed, he implored her to get a prenuptial agreement to protect her 
inheritance” (Flora 54). Regardless of the differing nature of prenuptial 
agreements, their basis remains firmly entrenched in the idea behind familial 
economic exchange, or in this modern case, the protection of this exchange. In 
her defence of prenuptial agreements, Arlene Dublin states: “If you think your 
marriage does not have economic consequences, then you're not living in the 
real world” (Flora 54). Dublin's statement reflects both a historical and modern 
overview of the marriage relationship as it relates to economic capital.  
If “[b]argaining resembled international treaty negotiations” (Gottleib 53) for 
past marital contracts, it seems little has changed as prenuptial agreements are 
similarly filled with emotions: “Jason, a 46-year-old financier now dissolving an 
eight-year marriage, thinks he is being cheated out of hard-earned money, and 
regrets not having a prenup [ … ] He wishes his financial matters had been 
settled in good faith at the outset” (Flora 54). Jason's experiences, however, 
reflect the marital contract tradition in which families would formalize economic 
exchanges prior to marriage as a means to diffuse future economic difficulties 
(Gottleib 53). While the situations and their immediate causes are different, a 
prenuptial agreement's basis as a marital contract and feature of economic 
exchange remains true to the historical model. 
The particular reason for the rise in prenuptial agreements, however, is 
related to a uniquely modern aspect of the marriage relationship: ‘no-fault' 
divorce (Flora 54). While virtually unheard of before the 20th century, 37% of 
Canadian marriages now end in divorce (Ambert 390). Hardy describes 12th 
and 13th century marriages as “equally down-to-earth arrangements simply to 
get land and power. Affection and respect were irrelevant, and if the ‘deal' 
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turned out badly, or a better one appeared, the wife was cast out, often on 
the grounds of incest” (Hardy 123). Although Hardy's description has no relation 
to the modern function of divorce, it is interesting to note the particular way in 
which females were treated previous to divorce laws. While historical marriages 
could be abandoned for better economic opportunities, modern divorce allows 
couples to split on even terms without fault to either party. The consequences 
of this policy, however, are that economic decisions – such as prenuptial 
agreements – must be factored into marriage early on, or else individuals stand 
to lose a large portion of their own economic capital. Hardy puts it rather simply: 
“All matters of the heart cost money. Marriage does. Affairs do. Divorce costs 
most of all” (Hardy 176). With divorce causing large economic changes in a 
family, particularly “[a] 20 to 40 percent income loss for women and 
children” (Ambert 207), individuals are focusing on marital economic exchange 
similar to their historical equivalent in terms of marital contracts. Modern 
divorce seeks to cover extremely comparable historical issues such as 
inheritance and land possession, which in turn forces modern couples to re-
examine their relationship in terms of an economic exchange. 
The modern functions of cohabitation, divorce, and prenuptial agreements, 
however, do not suggest that romantic love has disappeared. In fact, “[b]eing ‘in 
love' has been the main overt reason to marry for over a century” (Ambert 216). 
What has changed is that new social attitudes in terms of cohabitation along 
with modern divorce laws have reintroduced the exchange of economic capital 
into the marital arrangement. While “[t]here's nothing romantic about a 
prenup” (Goldberg 79), it has become an almost necessary step in the decision 
to marry due to a post-industrial economy in which children no longer rely on 
parents for large inheritances of land and entitlement (Smock, et al 689). The 
protection and exchange of economic assets in the modern world has become 
a necessary reality for many marriages. In fact, two heterosexual males have 
recently stated that they are planning to wed for the tax-benefits (Wright). While 
their marriage seems to be for entirely political reasons, it demonstrates an 
important trend in modern marriages that resembles the ‘economic exchange' 
marriage of pre-industrial years. Gottleib states: “Two hundred years is a long 
time, long enough for changes to have taken place in the relationships and 
institutions that come under the heading of ‘family'” (Gottleib 269). Her 
statement is both wrong and right at the same time. Changes have occurred 
that have greatly altered the marital landscape, however, these changes have 
also reintroduced the importance of economic exchange to marriage. While 
Hardy has described the last half of the 20th century as “the final degradation 
and therefore popularisation of romantic love” (Hardy 131), it is important to 
note that this period has also reintroduced models of marital economic 
exchange back into the popular culture.  
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